Abstract. We present a novel approach to automated distributed orchestration of Web services tied with security policies. The construction of an orchestration complying with the policies is based on the resolution of deducibility constraint systems and has been implemented for the non-distributed case as part of the AVANTSSAR Validation Platform. The tool has been successfully experimented on several case-studies from industry and academia.
Introduction
Composability, one of the basic principles and design-objectives of Serviceoriented Architecture (SOA) expresses the need for providing simple scenarios where already available services can be reused to derive new added-value services. SOA in its SOAP Web services incarnation based on XML messaging and relying on a rich stack of related standards provides a flexible yet highly interoperable solution to describe and implement a variety of e-business scenarios involving different services possibly bound to complex security policies. Therefore automated solutions should be considered for composition to realize scalability since the composed service can be very complex either to discover or even to describe, especially if some security constraints are to be respected.
Mainly two approaches to Web service composition have been considered, namely orchestration and choreography [23] . In the former a unique business process, called a Mediator, aggregates the existing services, while in the latter each service is responsible for implementing its part of the composed service.
We present in this paper a scalable Web service composition approach relying on the notion of partner corresponding to an organization. Each partner in a composition implements its own part of the orchestration. In this setting standard orchestration is a special case in which only one partner is involved, whereas choreography is another case in which there is one partner per available service. Several related "distributed orchestration" notions have been advocated for in the literature (e.g. [4] ). However in inter-organizational business processes it is crucial to protect sensitive data of each organization providing a component service in some orchestration, and our main motivation is to advance the state of the art by taking into account the security policies while computing an orchestration.
Contributions. First, we present a formal framework to model Web services, their security policies and their intercommunication. We consider a rich structure for Web services' messages including ciphered texts to ensure non-disclosure policies. We show that in this setting the distributed orchestration problem appears to be non trivial even for linear workflows. Second, we propose an algorithm to solve the distributed orchestration problem in this setting. Our decidability result relies on advanced symbolic constraint solving techniques. Finally the paper reports a freely available prototype implementation of the automatic Web services composition approach for the non-distributed case. This prototype is one of the few automatic tools (like [27, 12] Most works on service composition rely on a behavior model [11] , i.e. where services are considered as stateful and used by the Client according to some scenario. The behavior is usually presented as a Kripke structure, where transitions are labeled with services' operations [20] . Here we will give a small overview of related works.
A composition based on conversations (where a conversation is a sequence of messages exchanged by peers) was presented in [9] . The available services are represented by a finite set of message classes, a finite set of abstract peers (services) and a finite set of directed channels. Each channel consists of two endpoints and a set of message classes allowed to be sent over this channel. The composition problem amounts then to find a Mealy machine for each peer such that the set of possible conversations that can be seen by an external observer is equivalent to some given conversation specification.
Another work on the same lines is [7] . The authors suggest a way to synthesize and verify cryptographic protocols given a set of multiparty sessions that represent possible conversations between the participants. Given multiparty sessions represented as directed graphs whose nodes are labeled with protocol roles names and edges labeled with message descriptors and two sets of typed variables: the first one states the variables in which a role from the source node can write, and the second one -those variables from which the destination role can
